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Abstract—Wireless systems are vulnerable to various attacks
such as jamming and eavesdropping due to the shared and
broadcast nature of wireless medium. To support both attack and
defense strategies, machine learning (ML) provides automated
means to learn from and adapt to wireless communication
characteristics that are hard to capture by hand-crafted features
and models. This article discusses motivation, background, and
scope of research efforts that bridge ML and wireless security.
Motivated by research directions surveyed in the context of ML
for wireless security, ML-based attack and defense solutions and
emerging adversarial ML techniques in the wireless domain are
identified along with a roadmap to foster research efforts in
bridging ML and wireless security.
Index Terms—Wireless security, machine learning, adversarial
machine learning, attack, defense.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The research area of radio frequency machine learning
(RFML) has had extremely strong growth in recent years.
RFML solutions have been proposed to solve many problems
in the areas of wireless communications, networking, and
signal processing such as cognitive radio, spectrum sensing,
spectrum coexistence, jamming/anti-jamming, emitter identi-
fication, and intrusion detection [1]. While machine learning
(ML) is getting traction in wireless security applications such
as detecting conventional attacks, little work has been done
so far in investigating how vulnerable wireless systems are
to ML-based security and privacy attack vectors that have
recently been considered in other modalities such as image
recognition and natural language processing. In addition, com-
mercial applications for the internet of things (IoT) and 5G
communications and recent interest by government entities in
defense mechanisms to protect ML applications have shown
that security and privacy concerns of ML systems are ex-
tremely timely and relevant.
B. Scope and Background
ML offers invaluable tools for a diverse and far-reaching
set of applications ranging from image recognition and nat-
ural language processing to cyber security and autonomous
navigation. In recent years, applications of ML have emerged
in the wireless communications domain, forming a major
ingredient of a more general topic area, colloquially referred to
as RFML. In particular, ML systems based upon state-of-the-
art deep learning architectures, powered by the ever-increasing
hardware accelerations for computing, have been considered
for spectrum sensing applications (signal detection, estimation,
classification, and identification), channel estimation, emitter
identification, cognitive jamming and anti-jamming, among
many others. The success of these research thrusts are expected
to play an increasingly prevalent role in the development of
future generations of commercial wireless networks [2].
In the more established ML domains, recent research has
demonstrated the efficacy of utilizing adversarial ML to neg-
atively impact the performance of ML systems. Additionally,
vulnerabilities to the privacy and security of these systems,
and the data used to train the systems, have been exposed.
However, the impact of these concepts to RFML technologies
is currently underdeveloped. Therefore, it is a timely research
effort to investigate the interaction of RFML with wireless
security, privacy, robustness, and resilience. Given these facts,
it is imperative to combine research efforts in ML, RFML,
privacy, security, and wireless communications to further ad-
vance the state-of-the-art in security techniques, architectures,
and algorithms for ML in wireless systems.
Research efforts that are needed to address ML for wireless
security are diverse and include (but not limited to) the
following directions:
• Adversarial ML Techniques: evasion attacks (adversarial
examples), poisoning (causative) attacks, Trojan (back-
door or trapdoor) attacks, generative adversarial learning.
• Privacy Issues of ML Solutions: membership inference
attacks, model inversion, physical layer privacy.
• ML Hardening Solutions: privacy-preserving learning,
secure learning, hardware and software implementations,
edge computing, testbeds and experiments, datasets.
• Relevant ML Applications for Wireless Security: device
identification, spectrum monitoring, RF fingerprinting,
smart jamming, smart eavesdropping, localization, covert
communication, authentication, anonymity, intrusion de-
tection, IoT security.
This article surveys the recent efforts to address ML for
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wireless security in Section II, documents the challenges that
are still left to solve in Section III, and concludes with
recommendations for future research directions in Section IV.
II. RESEARCH EFFORTS
In this section, we highlight the research results presented
at the ACM Workshop on Wireless Security and Machine
Learning (WiseML 2019) that was held in conjunction with
the 12th ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless
and Mobile Networks (ACM WiSec). The goal was to bring
together members of the ML, RFML, privacy, security, and
wireless communications communities in order for them to
share the latest research findings in the emerging and critical
area of wireless security and ML.
The workshop consisted of a keynote, three sessions on
ML applications, two sessions on adversarial ML, and two
sessions on defense with ML. The keynote [3] highlighted the
applications of ML in wireless security with examples ranging
from conventional attacks formulated with ML to new types of
attacks enabled with ML. There were 13 paper presentations
and 8 invited talks in three main areas that are discussed in
the following three subsections.
A. Adversarial Machine Learning in Wireless Systems
Adversarial ML is an emerging field that studies learning
in the presence of adversaries [4], [5] and has received major
attention in other data domains such as computer vision [6].
In this subsection, we highlight potential uses of adversarial
ML in wireless domain.
• A generative adversarial network (GAN) was used in [7]
to generate spoofing wireless signals that cannot be dis-
tinguished from real signals. By accounting for channel,
waveform, and radio effects, an adversary was shown
to train a deep learning based generator that transmits
spoofing signals over the air, whereas the defender’s goal
was to train another deep learning based discriminator to
detect spoofing signals.
• A GAN was also applied in [8] to generate synthetic RF
signals that can be used to confuse spectrum users by
jammers, spoofers, and other attackers in wireless radio
environments. In particular, GAN models were fit to Long
Term Evolution (LTE) and Frequency Modulation (FM)
broadcast signals to demonstrate the feasibility of GANs
to generate realistic wireless signals.
• Defense mechanisms were developed in [9] to mitigate
targeted evasion attacks against deep learning-based RF
signal classifiers. Two different datasets were considered,
one on modulation recognition and the other one on WiFi
802.11n, Bluetooth and ZigBee classification.
• Another adversarial example was studied in [10] for tar-
geted attacks against RF signal classifiers. Direct access
to the inputs of a deep learning classifier was shown to
break down the classifier and the adversarial perturbation
power needed to cause source-target misclassification
could be used as a proxy for the model’s estimation of
their similarity.
• Adaptation of radio parameters such as power control was
considered in [11] against deep learning based predic-
tive adversaries in wireless communications. Lyapunov
optimization and virtual queues were used to satisfy
data transmission reliability in the presence of wireless
adversaries while minimizing power consumption.
• In addition to these papers, [12] surveyed research into
the threats that adversarial ML poses to deep learning
enabled cognitive radios. The primary focus was on eva-
sion attacks by providing a threat model that characterizes
attacks by their prior knowledge, their goals, and the
location the attack is launched from.
B. Machine Learning Applications in Wireless Security
In this subsection, we highlight various applications of ML
techniques in wireless security.
• Wireless virtualization (WiVi) was discussed in [13] for
high speed and quality-of-service (QoS) aware commu-
nications while reducing the deployment cost of wireless
infrastructure. A Blockchain was used to eliminate over-
committing of wireless resources of Wireless Infrastruc-
ture Providers such as RF channels, while ML optimally
predicts the QoS requirements.
• A survey of attacks on ML based wireless systems was
presented in [14]. These attacks ranged from model
extraction, model inversion and leak of information to
evasion and poisoning attacks that aim to manipulate the
integrity of test and training data, respectively.
• Based on siamese convolutional neural networks (CNNs),
a noise-robust signal classification solution was presented
in [15]. Trained on compressed spectrogram images,
siamese CNNs were shown to effectively distinguish
wireless signals by accounting for frequency offsets.
• ML for RF signal processing was discussed in [16] in
terms of catching the so called “Third Wave of AI”,
which refers to the paradigm shift in artificial intelligence
from statistical learning and deep neural frameworks, to
contextually adaptive, explainable, and generalizable cog-
nitive systems. Recent research programs in Academia,
Industry, and Government have been key indicators of
the growing interest in applying ML to wireless security
where the conceptual framework of the Third Wave is of
critical importance.
• The focus of [17] was on how to launch wireless jamming
attacks with the assistance of deep learning. The key
point was in exploratory attacks that aim to infer the
functionality of deep learning classifiers for spectrum
sensing followed by subsequent evasion and poisoning
attacks to misguide the target classifiers in test and
training phases, respectively.
• The rate and level of performance degradation that oc-
curs when CNNs are subjected to bit-flip errors, which
could result from single event upsets that occur in harsh
environments, were discussed in [18]. The discussion
provided a foundation for ongoing research that enhances
the overall resilience of neural network architectures
and implementations in space under both random and
malicious error events, offering significant improvements
over current implementations.
• Initiatives were presented in [19] to introduce students
to research in RFML applications. Different types of
adversarial ML attacks were discussed to highlight threats
to cognitive radio systems that increasingly rely on ML
to make data-driven automated decisions.
• Contextual combinatorial bandit learning was discussed
in [20] for online decision making under uncertainty. An
algorithm was presented to account for issues raised by
volatile arms and submodular reward functions and a
sublinear regret bound is proven.
• The focus of [21] was ML-defined 5G New Radio Net-
works. Reflecting recent advances in commercial systems,
robustness and security were discussed in the application
of ML to 5G systems.
C. Wireless Defense with Machine Learning
In this subsection, we highlight various cases of defending
wireless systems with ML techniques.
• Defense strategies were studied in [22] for mobile crowd-
sensing (MCS) that is vulnerable to illegitimate task
injection. ML was shown to eliminate illegitimate tasks
with high accuracy and save energy of battery-oriented
mobile systems.
• A software-defined radio (SDR) implementation was
presented in [23] to detect jammers using deep neural
networks. Wavelet transform was used as preprocessing
to CNN and recurrent neural network (RNN) classifiers
that were shown to detect jammers with high accuracy.
• Deep learning was applied in [24] to detect adversarial
and unintentional communication collisions in a shared
spectrum. CNN was used for classification purposes and
transfer learning provides the necessary means to scale
the training process.
• Intrusion detection in IoT systems was studied [25]
in the context of anomaly detection. Cumulative sum
control chart (CUSUM) was used for timely and accurate
anomaly detection followed by in-depth analysis of k-
Nearest Neighbors (KNN) distances.
• ML was applied in [26] to detect accurately and quickly
whether a drone is flying or lying on the ground. Random
forest and neural network classifiers were run on features
that are based on packet size and inter-arrival time of
communications between the drone and its remote con-
troller (RC).
• A quick and accurate ML-based detection and mitiga-
tion solution against IoT-empowered cyber attacks was
discussed in [27]. The attack space covered volumetric
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), synchronization-
based DDoS, protocol-based DDoS, Byzantine attack,
and false data injection attack.
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Fig. 1: Trust in ML for RFML.
III. CHALLENGES AND GAPS
One fundamental issue regarding the use of ML in wireless
communications and security is whether it is possible to trust
ML for these applications. While there are many challenges
regarding trust in RFML (with different components shown in
Fig. 1), that are universal (independent of data domain) such
as explainability and confidence, some challenges are specific
to the wireless domain such as the characteristics of the radio
hardware used and the inherent uncertainties associated with
the wireless medium.
A. Development Environment
One important challenge is how RFML should be deployed.
A multi-level development environment will be beneficial
while designing RFML solutions that rely on various wave-
form, channel and radio hardware characteristics. Simulation
tests mainly represent virtual hardware and channel effects that
may not reflect the real-world scenarios. Simulations need to
be followed with emulation tests that include both real traffic
and real radios. Emulation tests use actual radios making real
transmissions over emulated (virtual) channels [28]. Emulation
tests can be repeated by controlling channel effects such as
path loss, fading, and delay [29], [30]. On the other hand,
over-the-air (OTA) testbeds provide the opportunity to test the
system with real channels along with real hardware typically
in fixed settings.
Development environment for RFML should involve nec-
essary training and test datasets, and also reflect potential
changes between training and test conditions (e.g., indoor
vs. outdoor channel effects) under which data is collected
(see Section III-B for more detailed discussion of RFML
datasets). In addition, embedded computing should be ex-
plored to support edge applications and training data collection
for RFML (see Section III-B for more detailed discussion
of embedded implementation). Different aspects regarding the
need for multi-level development environment for RFML are
illustrated in Fig. 2.
B. Training and Test Datasets
ML requires relevant data for both test and training pur-
poses. In wireless security applications, the data needs to
reflect the underlying channel, waveform, radio, interference,
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Fig. 2: Development environment for RFML.
and adversary characteristics. While simulated data can be
controlled and configured to the needs of the ML problem at
hand, it typically lacks fidelity as it is difficult (if not impossi-
ble) to model all channel and radio effects reliably. Therefore,
real datasets captured over the air are useful resources for ML
problems in the wireless domain.
While there is a trend of releasing real datasets (e.g., see
[31]), there are not enough datasets available yet to accom-
modate various scenario needs, e.g., spectrum characteristics
in the presence of intelligent jammers. This paradigm raises
the danger that research efforts are tailored to the availability
of datasets, e.g., there is a plethora of research focused on
modulation recognition, where efforts pursuing other signal
classification tasks are lagging behind. Therefore, there is a
need to produce and publicly release real wireless datasets. In
particular, it is of paramount importance to build a wireless
security database similar to National Vulnerability Database
[32] in the cyber domain.
GAN and other synthetic data generation approaches can be
further applied for data augmentation and domain adaptation
to satisfy the large data needs of ML algorithms, in particular
deep learning. While GAN has been successfully applied to
generate synthetic data samples for computer vision [33] and
text analytics [34] that can be further used to strengthen attacks
on target systems [35], there is only limited work (e.g., [36])
yet to generate synthetic wireless signal samples to support
data augmentation and domain adaptation for wireless systems.
The typical practice is to apply pre-trained ML models to
wireless security. Online ML update mechanisms are needed
to continue with the optimization of attack and defense space
in test time. To that end, reinforcement learning is promising to
secure wireless communications in the presence of adversaries
such as jammers and eavesdroppers [37]. ML security in
wireless domain differs from its counterpart in other data
domains in terms of performance measures. ML can be used to
optimize the quality of communications measured by various
performance metrics such as throughput and delay subject
to power consumption requirements. These metrics are often
coupled with each other and need to be jointly optimized [38].
Spectrum is shaped by various effects such as channel,
inference, waveform, and traffic [39]. Due to the dynamic and
random nature of traffic flows and links in a wireless network,
it is imperative to maintain queue stability (i.e., queue length
remains bounded) [40], [41] while optimizing performance via
ML. One related performance metric that has gained interest
and may benefit from ML is the age of information (AoI) that
measures the information freshness (the time elapsed since the
last received update) [42].
C. Repeatability, Hyperparameter Optimization, and Explain-
ability
It is important not only to share the datasets but also the
ML code. This will help other researchers quickly extend
the proposed solutions to other wireless security problems or
compare their own solution to the proposed ones. A common
library of algorithmic solutions to ML-based wireless attacks
and defenses is ultimately needed. Deep learning has started
finding more applications in wireless security as it can capture
physical signal characteristics better than conventional ML
algorithms such as support vector machines.
There are four major issues to be solved with deep learning
before it can be practically used in wireless applications:
1) Deep learning requires large datasets to train. GAN is
one way for data augmentation. Additional methods can
be borrowed from computer vision and other domains or
new ones can be developed to meet this need.
2) Deep learning has many parameters to optimize such as
the number of layers and neurons. Hyperparameter op-
timization techniques are needed to match deep learning
performance to wireless security needs. These techniques
should reduce the computational complexity of parameter
search. For example, Hyperband [43] iteratively selects
and evaluates the performance of hyperparameter con-
figurations with increasing run times. Such techniques
reduce the time to select hyperparameters compared to
exhaustive search that becomes easily intractable as the
neural network structures become deeper.
3) Deep learning is typically used as a black box. However,
wide adoption of wireless security solution requires jus-
tification of the performance. For example, preprocessing
of spectrum data is crucial to extract features that can be
done through statistical, temporal, or spectral methods,
and deserves more attention from the research commu-
nity. In addition, future work should account for the
fact that wireless domain further increases discrepancy
between test and training data due to
• spectrum dynamics (channel, traffic, interference, and
radio effects change over time),
• model changes (data labels (e.g., signal types) may
change over time),
• noisy data (features, e.g., I/Q samples, are hidden in
noise, fading, and interference),
• distributed computing (training and inference may be
distributed at edge devices), and
• adversarial learning (wireless signals are vulnerable
to over-the-air attacks based on adversarial ML).
4) In a wireless medium, it is possible that new signal types
(such as jammers) may emerge over time. However, it is
costly to retrain the signal classifier, whereas accounting
only for new signal types may result in catastrophic
forgetting. Continual learning such as using elastic weight
consolidation (EWC) based loss function can be used
to strike a balance between old and new tasks to learn.
In particular, EWC slows down the learning process on
selected ML model parameters to remember previously
learned tasks. In wireless domain, EWC was applied to
the problem of wireless signal classification in [44] when
the classifier encounters new signal types over time.
D. Embedded Implementation
The typical practice is offline computation using central
processing unit (CPU) or graphics processing unit (GPU)
resources for ML tasks. However, embedded solutions are
needed for ML-driven wireless security to support online
decision making in size, weight, and power (SWaP) con-
strained radio platforms. While computational resources such
as ARM processors, embedded GPUs and field-programmable
gate arrays (FPGA) are available with a wide range of ca-
pabilities, research efforts supported by embedded platform
implementations are largely missing. Therefore, it is hard to
claim whether the current state of the art can match the low
latency and low power requirements of wireless security. As
examples of embedded implementation of ML solution, ML-
based signal authentication was implemented on embedded
GPU in [45] and ML-based modulation classification was
implemented on Android smartphone in [46].
An alternative implementation is on FPGA. Initial studies
showed that FPGA provides major improvements in latency
and energy consumption for ML-based RF signal classification
compared to embedded GPU [47], [48]. However, it is known
that it is difficult to program FPGAs compared to CPUs and
GPUs. Therefore, automated means are needed to convert soft-
ware codes of ML solutions (especially deep neural networks)
to FPGA implementation.
Table I qualitatively compares expected latency, power
consumption and programmability of different embedded com-
puting resources. To this end, more efforts should be put to
bridge the gap between theory and practice by implementing
the proposed solutions on embedded platforms and quantifying
latency and energy consumption to run ML solutions.
E. Adversarial Machine Learning
There is a growing interest in applying adversarial ML to the
wireless domain. The idea is to attack the training and/or test-
ing processes of ML developed for various application tasks.
When applied to wireless domain, such attacks operate with
small footprints and are stealthier and more energy efficient
compared to conventional attacks that directly target wireless
TABLE I: Performance of different of embedded computation
platforms.
Measure \ Platform ARM Embedded GPU FPGA
Latency High Medium Low
Power Consumption Medium High Low
Programmability High Medium Low
transmissions such as jamming [49], [50], while accounting for
uncertainties regarding wireless communications [51]–[53].
Different types of adversarial ML are illustrated in Figure 3.
Below, we discuss evasion attacks (adversarial examples), ex-
ploratory (inference), poisoning (causative) attacks, and Trojan
attacks in the context of wireless security:
• Evasion attack: In an evasion attack, the adversary ma-
nipulates the test data to fool a receiver into making errors
in classification decisions. Most of the studies in wireless
domain have focused on evasion attacks against modu-
lation classifiers [54]–[58]. Various defense mechanisms
are proposed against these attacks [59], [60]. There are
also efforts to apply evasion attacks to other ML-based
wireless applications such as spectrum sensing [61]–[63]
and end-to-end communications with an autoencoder [64]
(note that instead of using conventional communication
blocks, an autoencoder is trained with two deep neural
networks, one as an encoder at the transmitter and the
other one as a decoder at the receiver [65]).
• Exploratory attack: Exploratory attack aims to infer how
an ML algorithm of a victim system works. Typically, this
involves building a surrogate model that is functionally
equivalent to the victim ML system with the same types
of input and outputs [66]. In wireless domain, exploratory
attack was studied in [67], [68] to learn transmit patterns
of a communications system and build more efficient
jamming strategies based on the inferred transmit pattern.
Exploratory attack is typically the first step before launch-
ing subsequent attacks and benefits from methods like
active learning [69] that can help reduce the number of
data samples needed to reliably infer the inner workings
of an ML algorithm.
• Poisoning attack: Poisoning attack manipulates the train-
ing process of an ML algorithm such that the ML
algorithm does not produce outcomes as intended [70].
Wireless applications include spectrum data falsification
to fool classifiers that are built for spectrum sensing
[62], [63] and cooperative spectrum sensing [71]. These
attacks correspond to the ML-generalization of spectrum
sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks that have been
extensively studies in the context of cognitive radio
security [72].
• Trojan attack: Trojan attack manipulates training data
by inserting Trojans (i.e., triggers) to only few training
data samples in the training phase and then activates
those Trojans in the test phase to fool the ML model
into making wrong decisions [73]. To selectively fool a
wireless signal classifier, a Trojan attack was proposed in
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Fig. 3: Taxonomy of adversarial ML: evasion, poisoning
(causative), exploratory (inference), Trojan attacks.
[74], where the adversary modifies phases of few samples
and changes corresponding labels in training data, and
later transmits signals with the same phase shift that was
added as a trigger during training.
Adversarial attacks have been also considered in reinforcement
learning algorithms with various applications in computer
vision [75]. Studies of adversarial ML in wireless domain are
still in their early stages and more work is needed to fully
characterize the attack and defense spaces by accounting for
unique features of wireless applications such as differences in
features and labels observed by adversaries and defenders due
to different channel and interference effects.
IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on challenges and gaps identified in the previous
section, the following conclusions are made:
• While ML is critical to secure wireless systems, the
attack vectors have not yet been fully understood. More
efforts are needed to characterize the vulnerabilities of
wireless systems against adversaries that are employing
ML techniques. A clearly-defined ML-based attack model
is the precondition to formal analysis for ML-related
wireless security.
• As adversaries are getting smarter, defense schemes
should become more agile and adaptive; ML provides
these capabilities and is thus a powerful means to detect
and mitigate wireless attacks.
• Adversarial ML is important to understand, disrupt or
protect the ML process in the presence of wireless
adversaries. The wireless medium provides new means
for the adversaries to manipulate both test (inference)
and training phases of ML. To that end, novel techniques
are required to determine the wireless attack surface of
adversarial ML.
• The duel between both the attacker and the defender using
ML is an evolving, interactive process. Efforts are needed
to understand the dynamic evolution of this process with
quantification of performance metrics obtained by the
attacker and the defender.
• More high-fidelity and diverse datasets that are publicly
available are needed to support ML efforts for wireless
security. Embedded implementation is crucial to meet la-
tency, power and computational complexity requirements
of ML-based attacks and defenses in SWaP-constrained
environments.
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